The State must prove that the Defendant was a party to the crime. O.C.G.A. §16-2-20 defines party to the crime as follows:
a. Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime.
b. A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he:
1. Directly commits the crime;
2. Intentionally causes some other person to commit the crime under such circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity;
3. Intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or
4. Intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.
A defendant may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for a crime even though he did not directly commit the crime if it is proven that he was a party to the crime. Tabb v. State, 313 Ga. App. 852 (2012). It does not matter that the person claimed to have directly committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable to justice or has been acquitted. O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. The defendant does not have to be indicted as a party to the crime to be prosecuted under a party to the crime theory. Young v. State, 290 Ga. 392 (2012).
Conviction as a party to a crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal intent with the direct perpetrator of the crimes. A jury may infer a common criminal intent from the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with the other perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes. Felts v. State, 311 Ga. 547, 552 (2) (858 SE2d 708) (2021); Clements v. State, S23A0857 (December 19, 2023); Scoggins v. State, S23A0894 (December 19, 2023)
An accomplice to an armed robbery can be convicted of armed robbery even though the accomplice did not possess the weapon. Brayard v. State, A13A2318; Bryson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 512 (2012).
A defendant may be convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under a party-to-a-crime theory. See Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60, 65-66 (3) (805 SE2d 27) 16 (2017); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 371 (1) (578 SE2d 885) (2003); defendant may be convicted of that offense under a party-to-a-crime theory, where the defendant is a party to possession of a firearm by someone else who is a convicted felon. In that scenario, a defendant need not even constructively possess a firearm in order to be guilty of the crime. See Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 757-759 (II) (B) (808 SE2d 724) (2017) Scoggins v. State, S23A0894 (December 19, 2023)
A person who is present during the commission of a crime but does not directly commit a crime may be convicted upon proof that he was a party to the crime. However, mere presence at the scene of a crime or even approval of the criminal act not amounting to encouragement is not sufficient to show a defendant is a party to a crime. A common criminal intent must be proven. Criminal intent may be inferred from one's conduct prior to, during, and after the commission of the crime. Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 272 (2012; Robinson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 769 (1985).
A person's mere knowledge that a crime will be committed and failure to take steps to prevent the crime do not amount to aiding and abetting the crime. But if a person knew of the intended crime and shared in the criminal intent, the person is an aider and abettor. If the defendant was at the scene of the crime and did not disapprove or oppose the crime, a jury may consider that in connection with the defendant's prior knowledge of the crime to determine if the defendant aided and abetted the crime. Rinks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 37 (2011). A lookout can be convicted as a party to the crime. Campbell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 299 (2012). Standing near a co-defendant during a crime and leaving with the co-defendant can be sufficient proof of party to a crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331 (2007).
When an unintended victim is subjected to harm due to an unlawful act intended at someone else, the intent is transferred from the one against whom it was intended to the one who suffered the harm. Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743 (2012); Brown v. State, 313 Ga. App. 907 (2012).