A traffic stop is a type two investigatory stop. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Nunnally v. State, 310 Ga. App. 183 13(2011). An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional requirement that it be reasonable under the particular circumstances.
The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Rush v. State, A23A0637 (July 24, 2023); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In other words, an officer is authorized to stop a traveling vehicle if the officer observes a traffic offense. Worlds v. State, A14A1112; Rowe v. State, 314 Ga. App. 747 (2012). If the officer acting in good faith believes that an unlawful act has been committed, his actions are not made improper by a later determination that the defendant's actions did not constitute a crime according to the law. Chapman v. State, A23A0234 (June 27, 2023); White v. State, A12A1648; Lancaster v. State, 261 Ga, App. 348 (2003). Further, it does not matter that the statute under which the officer stops the car was later found to be unconstitutional. Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647 (2012); Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 (2004).
A radio dispatch may also be sufficient to authorize the stop of a vehicle. Brandt v. State, 314 Ga. App. 343 (2012); Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67 (2006) (radio dispatch concerning truck in which armed robbers had been seen, which described "the truck's color, number of occupants, road of travel, and direction of travel," gave officer reasonable suspicion to stop truck and investigate); Faulkner v. State, 277 Ga. App. 702 (2006) (radio dispatch concerning vehicle involved in criminal activity, which described "the color, manufacturer and model of the vehicle, the number and race of its occupants, and its location and direction of travel," gave officer reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle and investigate); McNair v. State, 267 Ga. App. 872 (2004) (radio dispatch concerning car observed leaving crime scene, which described the car, gave officer reasonable suspicion to stop similar car driving away from location of crime scene only minutes later and investigate).
An officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway and to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Sims v. State, 313 Ga. App. 544 (2012). A police officer conducting a routine traffic stop may check for outstanding warrants or criminal histories on the vehicle's occupants. The officer can also request consent to search the vehicle. Matthews v. State, 294 Ga. App. 836 (2008). The police may also ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, so long as the questioning does not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. Rush v. State, A23A0637 (July 24, 2023); Lewis v. Sate, A15A0099 Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 798 (2012); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735 (2006). Simply because someone is detained during a traffic stop does not mean that they are entitled to have their Miranda rights read to them. State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882 (2012).
Because concern for officer safety is present during a traffic stop, officers involved in a traffic stop may order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle. Rosas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 513 (2005); Eaton v. State, 294 Ga. App. 124 (2008). However, the officer may not perform a pat-down search of the driver or passengers unless the officer has a reasonable basis to believe the person is armed. To search the passenger of a car, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the passenger himself poses a threat to the officer. It is not appropriate to conduct a pat-down as a matter of routine or policy. Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 726 (2010). However, if a driver later consents to a search, any drugs discovered are admissible despite any prior illegal pat-down. The key factor is whether the drugs were found during the illegal pat-down or the later search with consent. Rogue v. State, 311 Ga. App. 421 (2011).
Once the purpose of a traffic stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second investigatory detention. Harklerod v. State, 317 Ga. App. 509 (2012); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735 (2006). Any continued detention must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the occupant of the car is engaged in other criminal activity. Dominguez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 370 (2011). Conflicting stories by the vehicle's occupants may be a basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115 (2011). An officer who lacks reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity exceeds the scope of a permissible investigation of a traffic offense if he continues to detain and interrogate the person, or seeks consent to search, after the conclusion of the traffic stop or after the tasks related to the investigation of the traffic violation have been accomplished. Bennett v. State, A13A2163; St. Fleur v. State, 296 Ga. App. 849 (2009). A reasonable time to issue a citation or written warning includes the time necessary to verify the driver's license, insurance, and registration, to complete any paperwork connected with the citation or written warning, and to run a computer check to determine whether there are any outstanding arrest warrants for the driver or the passengers. Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. App. 724 (2008). A request for consent to search that occurs at the conclusion of the traffic stop as the officer is returning the person their license and citation does not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. Sims v. State, 313 Ga. App. 544 (2012); Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43 (2011); Davis v. State, 306 Ga. App. 185 (2010).
An officer may have a trained drug detection dog walk around the exterior of the car while the officer completes his investigation of the traffic stop as long as the stop is not unreasonably prolonged. Rush v. State, A23A0637 (July 24, 2023);Lewis v. State, A1510099, Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432 (2011); State v. Rouse, 309 Ga. App. 536 (2011). The drug dog's sniffing the exterior of the car is a measure where purpose is detecting evidence does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Lewis v. State A1515A0099, Jackson v. State, 314 17Ga. App. 272 (2012); Bowers v. State, 276 Ga. App. 520 (2005). If the dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, the officer has probable cause and may search the vehicle. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. App. 161 (2008); Rogers v. State, 253 Ga. App. 863 (2002). The officer cannot complete his investigation and then have the drug dog sniff the vehicle. Migliore v. State, 240 Ga. App. 783 (1989); State v. Long, 301 Ga. App. 839 (2010); Beacoats v. State, 301 Ga. App. 768 (2009); Bennett v. State, 285 Ga. App.796 (2007); Langston v. State, 302 Ga. App. 541 (2010).
Roadblocks
Roadblocks are an exception to the rules concerning traffic stops. However, in order to justify a roadblock stop, the State must show at a minimum that the decision to create the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than officers in the field; all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops, the delay to motorists is minimal; the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and the screening officers training and experience is sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication. Lewis v. State, A23A032 (May 9, 2023);Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 658 (2013); LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251 (1998). If these factors are met, the appeals court will look at the totality of circumstances to determine if the stop was reasonable. An officer can 18be a supervisor even if he also screens motorists at the checkpoint. Jacobs v. State, 308 Ga. App. 117 (2011).